2023. “Robustly Embodied Imagination and the Limits of Perspective-Taking” in Philosophical Studies, co-authored with Adriana Clavel-Vázquez, doi:10.1007/s11098-023-01936-4.
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Abstract. Experiential imagination consists in an imaginative projection that aims at simulating the experiences one would undergo in different circumstances. It has been traditionally thought to play a role in how we build our lives, engage with other agents, and appreciate art. Although some philosophers have recently expressed doubts over the capacity of experiential imagination to offer insight into the perspective of someone other than our present-selves, experiential imagination remains a much sought-after tool. This paper substantiates pessimism about the epistemological value of these uses of experiential imagination by developing an embodied approach. Our thesis is that experiential imagination is robustly embodied because the sociohistorically situated body makes an irreducible contribution to the imaginative project, and that, as such, it is constrained by who we are as concrete agents. We argue that experiential imagination is an embodied, virtual exploration of imagined scenarios that depends on our situated history of sensorimotor and affective interactions. We conclude that experiential imagination is much more limited than commonly acknowledged, as it can hardly be divorced from who we are and where we have been.
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2020. “A Match Made in Heaven: Predictive Approaches to (an Unorthodox) Sensorimotor Enactivism” in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 19, 653–684, doi:10.1007/s11097-019-09647-0.
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Abstract. It has been pointed out that Sensorimotor Enactivism, a theory that claims that perception is enacted and brought about by movement, says very little about the neural mechanisms that enable perception. For the proponents of the predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism, this is a challenge that can be met by introducing predictive processing into the picture. However, the compatibility between these theories is not straightforward. Firstly, because they seem to differ in their stand towards representations: while Sensorimotor Enactivism is said to belong to the non-representational wing of cognitive science, predictive processing has a representational profile. And secondly, because they exhibit different explanatory strategies: while Sensorimotor Enactivism prioritizes the interactions of the embodied agent, predictive processing has internalist commitments. The aim of this paper is to address these concerns and show that a predictive approach to Sensorimotor Enactivism is viable.
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2018. “Minding Nature: Gallagher and the Relevance of Phenomenology to Cognitive Science” (co-authored with Michael Wheeler) in Australasian Philosophical Review, 2(2), 145-158, doi:10.1080/24740500.2018.1552085. Article commentary to Gallagher, S., (2018). “Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science” in Australasian Philosophical Review, 2(2), 125 – 137.
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Abstract. In ‘Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science’, Gallagher [2019] sets out to overcome resistance to the idea that phenomenology is relevant to cognitive science. He argues that the relevance in question may be secured if we rethink the concept of nature. For Gallagher, this transformed concept of nature—which is to be distinguished from the classic scientific conception of nature in that it embraces irreducible subjectivity—is already at work in some contemporary enactive phenomenological approaches to cognitive science. Following a summary of Gallagher’s argument, we argue that this rethinking of nature is not necessary to secure the aim in question. We articulate two alternative ways of achieving the relevance of phenomenology to cognitive science. The first, which turns on a minimal notion of naturalism, leaves the classic scientific conception of nature intact. The second, which turns on a practice-based analysis of collaboration between phenomenology and cognitive science, leaves it open which concept of nature one should adopt. As we show, each of the proposals on the table (Gallagher’s own and our two alternatives) comes at a cost. Which of the three proposals is the more attractive will depend on which cost one wants to pay.
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Commentary
2019. “Two challenges to the embodied version of the autopoietic theory” in Adaptive Behavior, doi:10.1177/1059712319839641.
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You can find a full list of my publications in my CV.